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Scientific Facts vs. Political Values
Thomas G. field, Jr.
1
As this issue goes to press, the National Academy complex
regards itself as under fire after Animal Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Shalala2 found it subject to the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(FACA). 3 This is notably reflected in a recent Science editorial,
Raiders of the Last Bastion.4 There, M. R. C. Greenwood, points
out how this will interfere with prompt and apolitical advice:
It takes 4 or 5 months to get a charter for a FACA committee.... [T]he government has set a cap on the total number
of FACA committees..., making it... impossible to create
400 new committees .... The regulations... also require...
appropriate balance... by considering individuals who are
affected and interested as well as expert, so that political
considerations become a factor in committee membership.
Streamlining and facilitating creation of Academy committees seems
warranted, but openness and, to the extent possible, balance seem to
offer the most reliable control for biases that cannot and probably
should not be eliminated.
Greenwood acknowledges that "FACA's aim to make the advisory
process more open" is "reasonable and important" and notes that the
Academy has opened information-gathering.He then gives two
reasons for closed deliberations: To prevent funding sources from
exerting pressure on committee members and to ensure that reports are
not made public prior to review satisfying "the Academy's standards of
evidence." Neither is compelling.
As recently emphasized by Carl Cranor, 5 merely selecting a
"standard of evidence" is inherently normative (or "political" in a
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As defined by Greenwood, infra note 4.
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104 F.3d 424 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
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Pub. L. 92-463, Oct. 6, 1972, 86 stat. 770, codified at 5 U.S.C. App. 2 (1996).
277 Science 163 (July 11, 1997). All quotations infra are taken from this page.
The Normative Nature of Risk Assessment: Features and Possibilities, 8 Risk
(1997).
8 Risk. Health, Safety & Environment 207 [Summer 1997]

narrow sense). Such issues should be openly addressed. 6 Moreover, as
7
noted elsewhere in this issue of Risk:
Compared with the period before about 1970, it is
unlikely that any scientific or technical group continues to
be politically detached. Most are intensely involved through
an elaborate system of consultancy, advisory committees
and participation as legal expert witnesses.
Some have made a case that nothing is purely objective, 8 but, to
the extent that this is true, the inherence of normative bias does not
compel undifferentiated treatment. The key questions are: How to
categorize types of bias, and what are appropriate controls in various
circumstances? For example, in contrast with fact, outcome or party
bias, Judge J. Skelly Wright found policy ("political" in the broadest
sense) bias acceptable, even desirable, in the context of agency rule
9
making:
The appellees have a right to a fair and open proceeding;
that right includes access to an impartial decisionmaker.
Impartial, however, does not mean uninformed, unthinking, or inarticulate.
Greenwood ends his editorial with a call to arms: "It is time for
those who care about scientific, not political advice, to speak out." He
also asks the Supreme Court or Congress to "fix the problem."
This seems to ignore the fact that most, if not all, advice sought by
agencies or Congress is implicitly, if not explicitly, "political" - in the
sense Greenwood contemplates. Scientists, ever less apt to be oblivious
to effects of their advice personally, professionally or socially, cannot be
isolated. Indeed, it seems difficult to support the proposition that, were
it humanly possible, those offering scientific advice should be utterly
heedless of its implications.

6 See, e.g., Thomas H. Pigford, Maximum Individual & Vicinity-Average Dose
for a Geologic Repository Containing Radioactive Waste, 8 Risk 9 (1997).
7 Halina S. Brown et al., Reassessing the History of U.S. Hazardous Waste
Disposal Policy..., infra 249, 271.
8 See, e.g., Sheila Jasanoff, Procedural Choices in Regulatory Science, 4 Risk 143,
145 (1993).
9 Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 627 F.2d
1151, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. den. 447 U.S. 921 (1980) (emphasis added).

